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ABSTRACT
This study experimentally investigates auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work regarding
complex estimates. Specifically, this paper examines how the relevance of specialists’ expertise
(or the degree to which their prior experience matches the current task), the opportunity for
auditor-specialist pairs to communicate, and the level of time pressure affect the extent to which
auditors rely on specialists’ estimates. To investigate the research question, I employ a mixed
experimental design in an abstract setting, where college students take on the roles of auditor and
specialist and work in auditor-specialist pairs to complete an estimation task. I manipulate the
relevance of specialists' expertise by providing specialists with training that matches
(mismatches) the estimation task that follows, auditor-specialist communication by allowing
auditor-specialist pairs to chat (not chat) on the computer, and time pressure by varying the
amount of time given to enter each estimate. My results show that the relevance of specialists’
prior experience affects auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise, which influences auditors’
trust in specialists, ultimately affecting auditors’ reliance in specialists’ advice. Additionally,
auditor-specialist communication significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialists, but only
when specialists have relevant prior experience. Furthermore, auditors’ opportunity to
communicate with specialists indirectly affects their reliance on specialists through their
developed trust due to auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise rather than a social bond. I
also find that auditors’ reliance on specialists is significantly affected by the relevance of
specialists’ prior experience, but only when time pressure is low. When time pressure is high,
there is no significant difference in auditors’ reliance based on specialists’ prior experience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Auditors’ use of specialists’ work on fair value measurements is heavily scrutinized. The
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) acknowledges current deficiencies and
recently responded by issuing two proposals to strengthen auditing standards regarding auditors’
use of specialists (PCAOB 2017b) and auditing accounting estimates, including fair value
measurements (PCAOB 2017a). The purpose of this study is to experimentally investigate
several of the primary concerns indicated by regulators, practitioners, and academics.
Specifically, this paper examines how the relevance of specialists’ expertise (or the degree to
which their prior experience matches the current task) and their communication with audit teams
affect the extent to which auditors rely on specialists’ estimates of fair value measurements, and
whether this relationship is moderated by time pressure.
Regulators encourage auditors to seek advice from specialists when dealing with
complex, material matters that require knowledge or skill beyond auditors’ own expertise
(AICPA 1994). Fair value measurements pose a unique challenge due to inherent estimation
uncertainty arising from unobservable, subjective inputs and imprecise estimation ranges
(Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra 2013; Griffin 2014; Cannon and Bedard
2017). As a result, they are fundamentally more difficult to audit. Following regulators’
recommendation, auditors who lack the expertise needed to make complex valuation judgments
often seek advice from specialists who generally help test client models and assumptions and
develop independent estimates (Griffith 2014; Cannon and Bedard 2017).
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Although using specialists should improve audit quality (PCAOB 2017b), PCAOB
inspections consistently indicate audit deficiencies regarding fair value measurements and the
use of specialists due to, for example, auditors obtaining insufficient understanding of, and overrelying on, specialists’ assumptions (Bratten et al. 2013; Boritz, Robinson, Wong, and
Kochetova-Kozloski 2014; Cannon and Bedard 2017). Prior qualitative research supports these
concerns, finding that some auditors over-rely on specialists’ work (Kadous and Zhou 2015),
while others ignore it (Griffith 2014). Practitioners and academics note that a lack of regulatory
guidance regarding the use of specialists in conjunction with inherent task complexity,
communication problems, and various other factors make it difficult for auditors to appropriately
assess and incorporate specialists’ work (Griffith 2014; Boritz et al. 2014).
It is important to examine present weaknesses within the auditor-specialist relationship,
particularly regarding fair value measurements, because fair value measurements are valuerelevant to financial statement users (Cannon and Bedard 2017) and inherently vulnerable to
biased reporting due to estimation uncertainty (Bratten et al. 2013), yet auditors often lack the
expertise to provide reasonable assurance over fair value measurements on their own. Because
the prevalence of fair value measurements in financial reporting is likely to continually grow
(CAQ 2011; Cannon and Bedard 2017), and the use of specialists is linked to fair value
measurements, the use of specialists is likely to grow as well. Therefore, it is increasingly
important to evaluate how auditors integrate valuation specialists’ work with other audit
evidence, as it directly impacts audit quality.
This study considers conditions in which the specialist’s prior experience differs from
his/her current valuation task, which is important because each engagement has unique valuation
settings and not all knowledge of fair value measurements is transferrable. Valuation specialists
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with prior stock-option pricing experience, for example, may not be the best choice to assess
goodwill impairment, or vice versa (Bratten et al. 2013). Prior research indicates that auditors
most often engage their firms’ in-house specialists when consulting valuation specialists.
However, accounting firms may not always have an available specialist with experience that is
specific to the auditor’s needs1 and, consequently, a mismatch is created between the specialist’s
experience and the current valuation task. Such a mismatched specialist could still be helpful, but
auditors should consider their background before heavily relying on their work (AICPA 1994).
Regulators, however, have noted auditors’ failure to thoroughly assess the appropriateness of
specialists’ qualifications (PCAOB 2015).
Regulators, practitioners, and academics also note a pervasive lack of auditor-specialist
communication, resulting in auditors’ insufficient understanding and testing of valuation models
and assumptions as well as inconsistent follow-up procedures (Griffith 2014; PCAOB 2015).
Communication problems between auditors and specialists are particularly concerning when
specialists are mismatched because, without communicating, auditors are less likely to consider
whether the assigned specialist is appropriate for the task and are, thus, less likely to reevaluate
their reliance on the specialist’s work. Furthermore, academics note that time pressure to meet
year-end deadlines can exacerbate the already-present communication issues (Griffith 2014).
Due to the potential interdependence of specialist expertise, auditor-specialist communication,
and time pressure, it is important to consider these three factors together.
To investigate the research question, I employ a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design in
an abstract setting, according to the tenets of experimental economics (Freidman and Sunder
1994), where college students take on the roles of auditor and specialist and work in auditor-

1

For example, a firm may not employ a specialist with matching experience or a specialist with matching
experience may not be available due to time constraints.
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specialist pairs to complete an estimation task analogous to fair value measurements. The
participants’ task is to guess the number of gumballs in a pictured container, and the general
procedures follow that of a typical judge-advisor system, in which both parties independently
make an initial decision simultaneously, the judge receives advice, and then the judge makes the
final decision (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013).2 Accordingly, in
my study, the auditor and specialist each view a picture of a container filled with gumballs and
make an initial estimate of the number of gumballs in the container. Then, the auditor learns the
specialist’s estimate, after which the auditor makes a final estimate.
Students in the specialist role receive training prior to the compensation rounds, during
which they gain experience guessing the number of gumballs (weight of kernels of corn),
creating a match (mismatch) with the experimental task, thus manipulating the relevance of
specialist expertise. To manipulate communication, the auditor-specialist pair is either allowed to
chat via the computer program, z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), or work without chatting. Finally, to
manipulate time pressure, each round has either a long or short time limit. Specialist expertise
and communication are both manipulated between-subjects, but time pressure is manipulated
within-subjects, so counterbalancing is implemented to control for potential order effects. The
dependent measure of interest is how much those in the auditor role adjust their estimate based
on the advice provided by those in the specialist role.
My results indicate a significant effect of the relevance of specialists’ prior experience on
auditors’ reliance on specialists, which is mediated through auditors’ perception of specialists’
expertise and their subsequent trust in specialists. Additionally, the opportunity to communicate
significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialists, but only when specialists have relevant
2

The judge-advisor system has been applied in prior audit studies, such as when auditors seek informal advice from
other auditors (e.g., Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013). Because the judge-advisor system also represents the
auditor-specialist relationship, it is appropriate for this study’s setting.

4

prior experience. I also find that auditors’ opportunity to communicate with specialists indirectly
affects their reliance on specialists through their trust in specialists. Furthermore, when
specialists have relevant prior experience, the opportunity to communicate with specialists
increases auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise as well as their bond with the specialist,
but only the perceived specialist expertise affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. When
specialists do not have relevant prior experience, the opportunity to communicate with specialists
only increases auditors’ bond with the specialist, not their perception of specialists’ expertise,
and only the perceived specialist expertise affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice.
Lastly, I find that auditors’ reliance on specialists is significantly affected by the relevance of
specialists’ prior experience, but only under conditions of low time pressure. When high time
pressure is present, there is no significant difference in auditors’ reliance based on specialists’
prior experience.
This study has important practical implications because the PCAOB is considering
revising existing auditing standards due to current reliance concerns regarding auditors’ use of
specialists’ work over fair value measurements (PCAOB 2017a, b). Results from this study
provide valuable insight for standard-setters by evaluating whether the relevance of specialists’
expertise affects auditors’ judgments and decisions when relying on specialists’ work and
whether increased communication between auditors and specialists is a potential solution for
current problems in the auditor-specialist relationship. This study also takes time pressure into
account, which is highly applicable in the audit setting due to typical busy season time
constraints.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II provides background on auditing fair
value measurements, advice-seeking and expertise, and auditors’ use of specialists; Section III

5

develops the hypotheses for specialist expertise, auditor-specialist communication, and time
pressure; Section IV explains the research methodology; Section V discusses the study’s results;
and Section VI concludes the paper.
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II. BACKGROUND
Auditing Fair Value Measurements
Fair value measurements3 are informative to financial statement users and are
increasingly required by regulators (Griffin 2014), yet they are inherently difficult to audit.
Estimation uncertainty arises from a combination of input subjectivity and outcome imprecision,
where input subjectivity refers to the input’s observability (classified as Level 1, 2, or 3) and
outcome imprecision signifies a range of potential values (Griffin 2014), which creates unique
complexity that involves significant judgment (Bratten et al. 2013). Evaluating fair value
measurements also requires extensive knowledge and training outside auditors’ accounting
expertise because various economic and business factors must be considered (CAQ 2011;
Bratten et al. 2013). As a result, auditors may misinterpret valuation models’ critical risks and
assumptions (Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015), potentially harming audit quality.
Ambiguous guidance from standard-setters exacerbates the situation by demanding
additional auditor judgment. AS 2501 and 2502 are both applicable to fair values in certain
cases,4 but it may be unclear how to best apply the standards (Bratten et al. 2013). Furthermore,
suggestions are given in lieu of specific guidelines, so auditors must decide whether to test
management’s process, develop an independent estimate, or review subsequent events (Bratten et
al. 2013; Griffith et al. 2015). Research shows that auditors often over-rely on management’s
model and assumptions and simply verify the components rather than develop independent
3

According to ASC 820, fair value is defined as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (FASB 2011).
4
AS 2501 involves auditing all accounting estimates, whereas AS 2502 specifically focuses on fair value
measurements and disclosures (AICPA 1989, 2003).
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estimates and assertions to better gauge the reasonableness of the model (Griffith et al. 2015).
Correspondingly, the PCAOB continually reports audit deficiencies related to fair value
measurements (Cannon and Bedard 2017).
Advice-Seeking and Expertise
Prior literature primarily focuses on taking, rather than giving, advice, but there is no
comprehensive advice theory (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In general, an advisor provides advice
to the decision-maker, referred to as the judge, who must then decide how to apply it. Research
shows that, although seeking advice can improve judges’ decisions by reducing mistakes, better
organizing information, and expanding focus (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), judges often discount
advisors’ recommendations due to, for example, anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1974),
egocentric bias5 (Krueger 2003), or lack of justification (Yaniv 2004), which results in less
optimal outcomes (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).
Advisor expertise, however, is shown to reduce advice discounting (e.g., Harvey and
Fischer 1997) because expert advice is viewed as more informative and is, thus, more persuasive,
particularly in complex settings (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). When complicated situations arise
and judges do not possess the necessary knowledge or skills, they must rely on advisors (Giddens
1990, 1991) who gain expertise through task-specific experiences and training (Bonner and
Lewis 1990). Using expert advice gives judges a sense of comfort (Giddens 1990, 1991) because
experts develop multifaceted cognitive structures through their experiences that allow them to
better organize and process complex information (Spilker and Prawitt 1997).

5

Harvey and Harries (2004) analyze anchoring and egocentrism, stating that anchoring is temporary and relates to
the present stimulus, whereas egocentrism is a long-term effect based on one’s opinion. After running two
experiments, Harvey and Harries (2004) conclude that egocentrism is the predominant cause of advice discounting
compared to anchoring.
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Auditors’ Use of Specialists
Auditors’ use of specialist advice continues to grow as the business environment becomes
increasingly complex. Specialists are now involved in roughly 90 percent of the audits at large
accounting firms (PCAOB 2015), are used for both private and public clients (Selley 1999),
cover a variety of fields, such as tax, information technology, and forensic accounting, and can
be incorporated at virtually any stage of the audit process (Bauer and Estep 2014; Boritz et al.
2014). They are known to help with audit team selection, materiality and risk assessments, and
audit planning, for example (Boritz et al. 2014). By seeking specialist advice, auditors can
improve their professional skepticism and judgments, enhance defensibility through better
justification, and reduce liability by shifting responsibility (Kadous et al. 2013).
Specialists are generally classified as either technical accounting or non-accounting and
as either internal or external. Technical accounting specialists are experts in specific accounting
and auditing issues, whereas non-accounting specialists’ expertise is in other fields, such as
valuation and credit risk assessment. Internal specialists are those employed by the accounting
firm, while external specialists work for a third-party and are contracted for the audit
engagement (Griffith 2014). To evaluate concerns about auditing fair value measurements, this
paper specifically focuses on the use of internal valuation specialists because the PCAOB notes
that many large accounting firms employ specialists (PCAOB 2015), and prior valuation
research indicates that the use of internal specialists is most prevalent.6
Qualitative research reveals that valuation specialists assist auditors by evaluating
preparer qualifications, analyzing preparer methodology, testing model accuracy, and evaluating
underlying assumptions, such as discount rates, market benchmarks, and industry trends (Griffith
6

Of the auditors interviewed in Griffith (2014), 26 utilized internal specialists compared to only 6 using external
specialists. Also, Cannon and Bedard (2017) finds that auditors use valuation specialists in 86 percent of
engagements, over 85 percent of whom are internal.
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2014). They also help develop independent estimates for comparison purposes (Cannon and
Bedard 2017). Auditors, on the other hand, focus on evaluating client-specific financial
measures, such as expected revenues and expenses (Griffith 2014), which they can better assess
due to their experience on the audit engagement. Actual practices may vary across engagements,
though, due to a lack of specific guidance7 (Boritz et al. 2014; Griffith 2014).
Concerns about Auditor Reliance on Specialist-provided Valuations
Although seeking expert advice is one of the primary ways auditors can reduce
estimation uncertainty surrounding complex estimates (Cannon and Bedard 2017), regulators,
practitioners, and academics have expressed concern regarding auditors’ use of specialists’ work
by identifying cases of both over- and under-reliance on specialists. According to AS 1210, when
using a specialist, auditors must develop an understanding of the specialist’s method, test
pertinent data, and evaluate the specialist’s conclusions (AICPA 1994; Cannon and Bedard
2017), because even experts occasionally misinterpret information and give bad advice (Giddens
1990; Kadous et al. 2013). To remain professionally skeptical, all audit evidence, including that
from specialists, should be appropriately scrutinized (AICPA 1972).
However, some studies find that auditors over-rely on specialists by failing to
appropriately understand and evaluate the reasonableness of specialists’ methods and findings
(Bratten et al. 2013; PCAOB 2015). Griffith (2014) notes that auditors are often more focused on
their own work and less concerned with reviewing specialists’ work, possibly viewing it as
peripheral (Kadous and Zhou 2015). Conversely, auditors are also shown to under-rely on

7

AS 2501 and 2502 refer auditors to AS 1210 for guidance on the use of specialists (AICPA 1989, 2003). However,
AS 1210 only covers external, non-accounting specialists. AS 1201 is for internal specialists, but only with technical
accounting expertise (AICPA 2006). Therefore, there are no established guidelines for auditors using internal, nonaccounting specialists. Griffith (2014) finds that auditors often follow AS 1210 for internal valuation specialists, but
it lacks specific details about when and how auditors should involve specialists.
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specialists by ignoring specialist caveats8 they deem insignificant, editing specialist wording for
clarification purposes, and even deleting information that contradicts other audit evidence
because they consider it immaterial (Griffith 2015). As a result, the specialist report is modified
in such a way that it supports the audit team’s own view and disregards specialist involvement.
In either case of under- or overreliance, audit quality is diminished.

8

Specialist caveats call attention to items the specialist thinks are important and/or require follow-up procedures.
There are three types of caveats. Recommendation caveats suggest changes to the client’s current valuation method,
open item caveats point out valuation inputs the auditor is responsible for testing, and reservation caveats describe
potential problems uncovered during specialists’ tests (Griffith 2015).
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Specialist Expertise
Experts are considered reliable because they possess domain-specific knowledge that
enables them to better interpret information in their identified field, and their expertise likely
transfers between similar settings (Hammersley 2006), such as companies operating in the same
industry. Prior research confirms that, in cases requiring industry-specific knowledge, industry
expertise positively affects audit quality (for e.g., Bedard and Wright 1994; Wright and Wright
1997; Wright and Bedard 2000). However, expertise is not generally applicable, and industry
specialists working in a different industry lose their comparative advantage. Hammersley (2006)
demonstrates that auditors with relevant, or matched, industry expertise develop more elaborate
problem representations and, thus, respond to indications of potential misstatement more
effectively than auditors with irrelevant, or mismatched, industry experience.
Likewise, valuation specialists’ expertise and experiences are not automatically
interchangeable due to the unique aspects of different valuation tasks (e.g. stock-option pricing
versus estimating goodwill impairment) and distinct engagement settings (Bratten et al. 2013).
Recognizing the importance of relevant expertise, AS 1210 states that auditors should evaluate
whether the specialist’s qualifications are appropriate for the specific task when determining
specialist involvement (AICPA 1994). However, the PCAOB maintains that auditors
inadequately evaluate specialists’ expertise and need to more thoroughly assess specialists’
knowledge, skill, and objectivity (PCAOB 2015). Griffith (2015)’s results support this concern,
finding that only 68 percent of auditors interviewed consider specialist characteristics, which
12

prompts the first set of hypotheses in this study examining auditors’ reliance on specialists with
different degrees of relevant expertise.
Bonaccio and Dalal (2006) state that the extent to which judges rely on advice is
positively related to the level of trust they have in the advisor, which can be affected by
numerous factors, including the advisor’s prior experience (Griffith 2014). As advisors obtain
more task-relevant knowledge and experience, they develop “expert power”, which increases
judges’ trust in advisors, prompting judges to weigh their advice more heavily (Bonaccio and
Dalal 2006). Therefore, I propose a serial mediation model in which the relevance of specialists’
prior experience affects auditors’ perception of specialists' expertise and, thus, their trust in
specialists, which ultimately affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. Auditors who
receive advice from specialists with more relevant experience will weigh advice more heavily
than those who receive advice from specialists with less relevant experience due to their
perception of the specialist as a relevant expert, which increases their trust in the specialist. The
first set of hypotheses is as follows:
H1a: Auditors will rely more (less) heavily on specialists' advice when specialists have
more (less) relevant, or matched (mismatched), experience.
H1b: The relevance of specialists' experience indirectly affects auditors' reliance on
specialists' advice through auditors' perceptions of specialists' expertise and their
subsequent trust in specialists.
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual Diagram of Serial Mediation Analysis for H1
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Auditor-Specialist Communication
Employed specialists at large accounting firms are often integrated into the core audit
team (PCAOB 2015) and are involved throughout the engagement (Griffith 2015). However,
valuations specialists are typically only engaged for certain tasks and are not considered audit
team members (Boritz et al. 2014). Due to poor communication between auditors and valuation
specialists, the current modular structure has resulted in auditors insufficiently understanding
valuation models and assumptions, inadequately testing source data, discounting specialists’
findings, and failing to follow-up on specialist caveats (PCAOB 2015; Griffith 2015), which all
increase the likelihood of audit deficiencies. To alleviate problems, the PCAOB recommends
better auditor-specialist integration and communication (PCAOB 2015), which motivates my
research question about communication.
Prior qualitative research discusses how better communication between auditors and
specialists leads to more effective collaboration between the two parties (Bauer and Estep 2014).
By allowing specialists to provide auditors with their reasoning and justifications, inappropriate
advice discounting should diminish (Yaniv 2004). Better communication may also help develop
stronger social bonds and improve trust between the two parties. Bowlin, Hobson, and Piercey
(2015) find that giving auditors and managers the opportunity to chat increases the extent to
which auditors trust management representations. In this regard, improving communication
between auditors and specialists should increase auditors’ trust in specialists and, thus, their
reliance on specialists’ work.
While this is likely beneficial when the specialist has relevant experience, it may be
detrimental in cases of specialist mismatch. The trust heuristic results in heavily weighing advice
regardless of justification, particularly in complex settings such as fair value measurements

15

(Kadous et al. 2013), so increased communication leading to increased trust could result in an
overreliance on inappropriate advice. On the other hand, because trust in experts is affected by
perceived expert effectiveness (Griffith 2014), bringing specialist mismatch to light through
increased communication may reduce auditor reliance. Therefore, I expect auditor-specialist
communication to affect auditors’ reliance on specialists through auditors’ trust in specialists.
When specialists have relevant prior experience, auditors are likely to rely more heavily on their
work when communication is available. However, due to competing arguments, the directional
effect of communication when specialists do not have relevant experience is undetermined at this
time. The second set of hypotheses is as follows:
H2a: Auditor-specialist communication will increase the extent to which auditors rely on
matched specialists’ advice.
H2b: Auditor-specialist communication will affect the extent to which auditors rely on
mismatched specialists’ advice.
H2c: Auditor-specialist communication indirectly affects auditors’ reliance on
specialists’ advice through auditors’ trust in specialists.
H2d: Auditor-specialist communication will increase the extent to which auditors trust
specialists when specialists have more relevant, or matched, experience.
H2e: Auditor-specialist communication will affect the extent to which auditors trust
specialists when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience.
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FIGURE 2
Conceptual Diagram of Moderated Mediation Analysis for H2
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Time Pressure
Another concern regarding auditors’ use of specialists’ work is the effect of time
pressure9 resulting from auditors’ and specialists’ excessive workloads at year-end, which prior
research notes exacerbates the communication problems previously discussed (Griffith 2014).
Psychology research generally indicates that time pressure is detrimental to task
performance due to increased psychological stress (Low and Tan 2011), which was also the
predominant view in much accounting literature. For example, prior accounting studies show that
audit quality declines as time pressure escalates (see DeZoort 1998). Because auditors have
limited time to complete year-end procedures, they likely use filtration as a coping mechanism,
which causes them to focus on key audit areas and only consider the most important information
(Sevenson and Edland 1987; Glover 1997). Although this strategy increases audit efficiency, it
can also lead to lower audit quality if relevant information is mistakenly ignored. Studies show
that elevated time pressure can hurt audit effectiveness by reducing the time spent reviewing
pertinent information (McDaniel 1990; Arnold, Sutton, Hayne, and Smith 2000) and causing
auditors to accept weaker audit evidence and prematurely sign-off on audit procedures (Kelley
and Margheim 1990; Glover 1997).
Alternatively, several accounting researchers have documented various benefits of time
pressure, such as increased task focus, motivation, efficiency, and job satisfaction (see DeZoort
1998), thus refuting the view that time pressure is always bad. Spilker (1995) finds that time
pressure positively affects tax researchers’ performance when they have relevant prior
experience, and Spilker and Prawitt’s (1997) extension, which further investigates the interaction

9

Time pressure literature has two distinct classifications, time budget pressure, which involves allotted amounts of
time allowed to complete each task, and time deadline pressure, which arises from specific points in time set for task
completion (DeZoort and Lord 1997; DeZoort 1998). Most prior research examines time budget pressure, whereas
the focus of this paper is time deadline pressure (henceforth referred to solely as “time pressure” for simplicity).
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between time pressure and expertise, concludes that acquired knowledge enables decision
makers to better identify and encode important information in an efficient manner when facing
time pressure.
Considering the potential for both positive and negative effects, many now describe the
relationship between time pressure and performance as an inverted-U function, in which
performance is initially low because low stress allows individuals to attend to many cues,
including those that are irrelevant. Then, as stress rises, individuals’ attention improves and they
focus more on relevant information. At a certain point, however, the stress becomes
overwhelming and even relevant material is disregarded, resulting in diminished performance
(Easterbrook 1959; Choo 1995; Spilker 1995; DeZoort and Lord 1997). Because auditors face
extreme time pressure at year-end, it is likely they fall at the far end of the inverted-U function
where performance is suboptimal due to excessive stress. Furthermore, because prior research
provides evidence that auditors accept weaker audit evidence when facing time pressure, I expect
additional time pressure to negatively affect audit quality by increasing auditors’ reliance on
specialists’ work, even in the case of specialist mismatch.
Based on H1, auditors are expected to rely more on matched specialists’ work, so greater
time pressure may still increase the extent of reliance, but it is likely to result in a smaller change
because there is less room for growth, as they are already relying so heavily. On the other hand,
H1 predicts that auditors will rely less on mismatched specialists’ work, so there is more room
for growth. Therefore, increased time pressure is expected to have a greater positive effect on
auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work when the specialist is mismatched. The third hypothesis is
as follows:
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H3: Time pressure will have a more positive effect on auditors’ reliance on specialists’
advice when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience compared to more
relevant, or matched, experience.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Setting
To examine the underlying theory, this study applies experimental economics methods
(Friedman and Sunder 1994) using an abstract, cooperative game in a controlled laboratory
setting analogous to the audit setting of interest but excluding audit-specific context. Participants
are randomly assigned to either the auditor or specialist role10 and work together in pairs on an
estimation task that corresponds to fair value measurements. To provide real economic
incentives, students are paid a $5 participation fee and have the opportunity to earn additional
compensation based on their judgments. A $10 prize is awarded each round to the pair with the
most accurate final estimates, giving $5 to each winning participant. There are 20 rounds
altogether, so each participant has the opportunity to earn between $5 and $105 in total.
Participants
The populations of interest are all professional financial auditors and valuation specialists
in the United States. However, because my setting is simple and abstract, it is not necessary that
participants have auditing knowledge and experience. Therefore, consistent with experimental
economics literature (Friedman and Sunder 1994; Kachelmeier and King 2002) and the advice of
Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson (2002), the participants consist of college students rather than
practitioners. I recruited participants for my experimental sessions from accounting classes at the
University of Mississippi. All volunteers at least 18 years old were accepted into the study. As an

10

To maintain an abstract setting, the participant materials use generic language. “Guesser” and “Estimator”
correspond to the auditor and specialist roles, respectively.
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additional note, the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved this
study before I started any data collection.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007), which
randomly assigned participants as either the auditor or specialist.11 Written instructions
describing the setting and each player’s role were given to participants, which I also read aloud
at the beginning of the session.12 Those assigned as the specialist then completed 20 training
rounds. During each training round, each specialist viewed a picture on the computer of a
container, which changed each round, filled with either gumballs or kernels of corn (see design
section below), entered an estimate of the amount, and then learned the correct amount. By
receiving feedback after each round, the specialists were able to refine their estimation process
and improve decision accuracy (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), thus developing expertise.13
To accommodate auditors while specialists were training, they each received a packet
that contained a crossword puzzle, word searches, and a Sudoku puzzle, which they were able to
work on while they waited. They were instructed that these activities were completely optional,
unrelated to the experiment, and did not affect their earnings.
Once training was complete, the compensation rounds began, at which time z-Tree
randomly paired each auditor with one specialist. These pairings remained unchanged for all 20
rounds. At the beginning of each round, participants viewed a picture of a container, which
changed each round, filled with gumballs, and both the auditor and specialist submitted an initial
estimate. Depending on the experimental condition, the auditor and specialist were then either

11

Appendix B provides screenshots of z-Tree for both the auditor and specialist roles.
Appendix A provides the written instructions that were read aloud. A bulleted, outline version was given to
participants to follow along.
13
The participant instructions emphasize that participant earnings are not determined by the training rounds.
12
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allowed to chat via z-Tree for 30 seconds or not. Once the chat concluded (if applicable), the
auditor was notified of the specialist’s estimate. The auditor then submitted a final estimate, thus
ending the round.14 Participants did not receive any feedback during the compensation rounds to
prevent learning effects.
After completing all 20 compensation rounds, participants were notified that the
experiment concluded. They then filled out a post-experimental questionnaire,15 which included
comprehension checks; measures of perceived expertise, trust in their partner, bond with their
partner, and trait skepticism;16 and key demographics. Before leaving, they received their
participant fee of $5 and any prize money they earned.

14

The procedures implemented in this study follow that of a typical judge-advisor system, during which the judge
and advisor simultaneously make an initial decision based on equally available information, the judge receives the
advisor’s recommendation, and then the judge decides how heavily to weigh the advice when making the final
decision (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).
15
Appendix C provides participants’ post-experimental questionnaire.
16
Hurtt (2010) develops a scale to measure trait professional skepticism consisting of six factors: a questioning
mind, a suspension of judgment, a search for knowledge, interpersonal understanding, self-esteem, and autonomy.
Because a search for knowledge and interpersonal understanding are not pertinent to this study, those items were
removed from the post-experimental questionnaire.

23

FIGURE 3
Detailed Procedures of Experiment

INTRODUCTION
Participants View Hardcopy Outline of Instructions, while Experimenter Reads Full Version
Aloud
Participants Randomly Assigned to Roles of Auditor or Specialist

TRAINING ROUNDS
Computer Provides Role-specific Instructions for Training Rounds, then Round 1 Begins
Specialist Views Picture of Gumballs (Corn) and Enters
Estimate of Number of Gumballs (Weight of Corn)
While Still Viewing Picture, Specialist is Reminded of
Their Estimate and Learns Correct Amount

Auditor Waits for Specialist to
Train (Has Option to Work on
Various Games/Puzzles)

After 20 Rounds, Computer Announces End of Training Rounds

COMPENSATION ROUNDS
Auditor-Specialist Pairs are Randomly Assigned (Remain Partners for All 20 Rounds)
Computer Provides Role-specific Instructions for Compensation Rounds, then Round 1 Begins
Participants View Picture of Gumballs and Enter an Estimate (Have Time Limit of Either 5 or 20
Seconds, where First 10 Rounds and Last 10 Rounds are Counterbalanced)
In Chat Condition, Auditor and Specialist Have
Opportunity to Chat for 30 Seconds via z-Tree

In No Chat Condition, Auditor and
Specialist View Wait Screen for 30 Seconds

Auditor Learns Specialist’s Estimate

Auditor Enters Final Estimate (Have Same Time Limit as with Pre-Chat Estimate)
After 20 Rounds, Computer Announces End of Compensation Rounds

CONCLUSION
Participants Fill Out Post-Experimental Questionnaire and Receive Payment
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Design
This experiment uses a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design. The first independent variable, specialist
experience, is manipulated between-subjects at two levels. In the Matched condition, specialists
train by estimating the number of gumballs in various containers, while those in the Mismatched
condition train by estimating the weight of corn. Although both groups of specialists gain some
form of estimation experience, those in the Matched condition gain directly relevant experience
because the actual experimental task in all conditions is estimating the number of gumballs,
whereas those in the Mismatched condition do not. Therefore, only specialists’ in the Matched
condition gain relevant expertise for auditors’ assigned task.
The second independent variable, communication, is also manipulated between-subjects
at two levels, where auditor-specialist pairs in the Chat condition are able to communicate during
the experiment through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box, while auditor-specialist
pairs in the No Chat condition are not. In the Chat condition, participants are able to
communicate with their partner for 30 seconds after making their initial estimates but before the
auditors make their final estimates. To maintain ceteris paribus conditions, those in the No Chat
condition also wait 30 seconds between the initial and final estimates, but they have a “wait
screen” instead of a chat box available. After the 30 seconds, the specialist’s initial estimate is
revealed to the auditor before he/she enters the final estimate.
The third independent variable, time pressure, is a within-subjects variable and is
manipulated by allotting auditors either 5 seconds or 20 seconds to submit each estimate during
the round. Following Spilker (1995), I conducted a pilot study approved by the university’s IRB
to determine the appropriate length of time to give participants for each level of time pressure.
The results of the pilot indicated that 20 seconds induces low time pressure by providing
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participants enough time to comfortably make an estimate without feeling rushed but not having
excess time left over, whereas 5 seconds induces high time pressure by providing participants
with the minimum time necessary to make an estimate. To avoid potential order effects of this
within-subjects variable, I counterbalanced the time limits such that half of the participants faced
the 5 (20) second time limit during the first 10 compensation rounds and the 20 (5) second time
limit during the last 10 rounds.
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V. RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants were asked to identify whether the
tasks for the training and compensation rounds were the same, which was to estimate the number
of gumballs. Most participants (84%) answered the manipulation check correctly based on their
assigned specialist experience condition (answered “true” for matched condition and “false” for
mismatched condition). However, those who failed the manipulation check were eliminated from
the sample because I am unable to disentangle whether they misunderstood the training task
and/or the compensation task, the proper understanding of which is vital for my analysis.
Tests of H1
H1a states that auditors will rely more heavily on specialists' advice when specialists
have more relevant, or matched, experience than when they have mismatched experience. Table
1, Panel A lists the means and standard deviations for key variables across all independent
variables, which provides support for my prediction for H1a. Reliance on specialist is measured
as the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial estimate and the specialist’s advice
that the auditor’s final estimate adjusts,17 thus demonstrating the extent to which auditors utilize
specialists’ advice when making their final decision (Kadous et al. 2013). For between-subjects
factors (specialist experience and communication), reliance on specialist is averaged over all

17

Reliance on specialist = (auditor final estimate– auditor initial estimate) / (specialist advice – auditor initial
estimate). This definition follows Kadous et al. (2013), excluding absolute values due to potential interest in
directional movement. Because reliance on specialists is an unbounded dependent variable, outliers were winsorized
at the top and bottom three percent. As a robustness check, reliance on specialists was also rank ordered; results
were statistically unchanged.
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available rounds for each participant, resulting in one observation per participant. For the withinsubjects factor (time pressure), reliance on specialist is averaged over all available rounds for
each participant within each time pressure condition, usually resulting in two observations per
participant.18 Per Table 1, Panel A, auditors in the matched condition rely more heavily on
specialists’ advice (mean = 62.03%) than auditors in the mismatched condition (mean =
47.45%).

18

During each round, participants who exceeded the time limit were not able to submit an estimate. Participants who
did not submit an estimate for at least half of the rounds per time pressure condition were excluded from the sample
for that respective time pressure condition. Thus, not all participants are present in both time pressure conditions.
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TABLE 1
Means (Standard Deviations) by Experimental Condition
Panel A: By Independent Variable

n
Reliance on
Specialist

Specialist Experiencea
Match
Mismatch
n = 26
n = 22

Communicationb
Chat
No Chat
n = 24
n = 24

Time Pressurec
High
Low
n = 43
n = 48

62.03%
(24.74%)

47.45%
(30.62%)

60.52%
(20.13%)

50.17%
(34.20%)

56.42%
(29.81%)

54.53%
(28.18%)

Professional
Skepticism

72.31
(6.92)

72.86
(8.47)

71.24
(7.90)

73.89
(7.19)

72.82
(7.96)

72.56
(7.59)

Perceived
Specialist
Expertise
Trust in
Specialist

4.19
(1.67)

2.77
(1.19)

4.17
(1.27)

2.92
(1.72)

3.63
(1.68)

3.54
(1.62)

5.04
(1.84)

4.64
(2.30)

5.79
(1.50)

3.92
(2.12)

4.95
(1.96)

4.85
(2.05)

Bond with
Specialist

3.08
(2.08)

3.45
(2.28)

4.83
(1.81)

1.67
(1.01)

3.14
(2.09)

3.25
(2.16)

Estimation
Error

-12.16%
(27.49%)

-72.53%
(11.61%)

-33.82%
(42.77%)

-45.84%
(30.47%)

-38.26%
(38.93%)

-40.89%
(35.89%)

Chat
n = 10

Mismatch
No Chat
n = 12

Panel B: Specialist Experiencea x Communicationb
Chat
n = 14

Match
No Chat
n = 12

n
Reliance on
Specialist

68.73%
(16.60%)

54.21%
(30.68%)

49.04%
(19.66%)

46.13%
(38.33%)

Professional
Skepticism

70.52
(6.22)

74.40
(7.36)

72.26
(10.08)

73.37
(7.31)

Perceived
Specialist
Expertise
Trust in
Specialist

4.86
(0.95)

3.42
(2.02)

3.20
(1.03)

2.42
(1.24)

5.93
(1.21)

4.00
(1.95)

5.60
(1.90)

3.83
(2.37)

Bond with
Specialist

4.36
(1.95)

1.58
(0.90)

5.50
(1.43)

1.75
(1.14)

Estimation
Error

-3.80%
(28.26%)

-21.91%
(24.11%)

-75.85%
(12.52%)

-69.78%
(10.53%)

29

TABLE 1 (continued)
Panel C: Specialist Experiencea x Time Pressurec
Match

Mismatch
Low
n = 22

n
Reliance on
Specialist

High
n = 24

Low
n = 26

High
n = 19

61.53%
(24.98%)

62.18%
(25.80%)

49.97%
(34.61%)

45.49%
(28.76%)

Professional
Skepticism

72.57
(7.12)

72.31
(6.92)

73.13
(9.12)

72.86
(8.47)

Perceived
Specialist
Expertise
Trust in
Specialist

4.29
(1.68)

4.19
(1.67)

2.79
(1.27)

2.77
(1.19)

5.13
(1.68)

5.04
(1.84)

4.74
(2.31)

4.64
(2.30)

Bond with
Specialist

3.00
(1.96)

3.08
(2.08)

3.32
(2.29)

3.45
(2.28)

Estimation
Error

-10.86%
(29.99%)

-14.49%
(26.57%)

-72.86%
(10.99%)

-72.08%
(12.66%)

a

Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the
partnered compensation rounds.
b

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
c

Time pressure was manipulated as a within-subjects variable. When high (low) time pressure
was present, auditors had 5 (20) seconds to submit each estimate.
Variable definitions:
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
Professional Skepticism was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Each auditors'
professional skepticism score was calculated based on 19 items from the Hurtt (2010) trait
skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance) using a sevenpoint Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing the individual's
score by 133.
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.
Auditors assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a
seven-point Likert scale.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
Estimation error = the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate and the
correct amount.
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To formally test my hypotheses, I employ a repeated-measures Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA) model shown in Table 2, Panel A. The dependent variable is reliance on specialist
and the independent variables are specialist experience, communication, and time pressure,
which are coded as either “1” or “0” for matched versus mismatched experience, chat versus no
chat, and high versus low time pressure, respectively. I also include auditors’ professional
skepticism as a covariate, which was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.19 The
ANCOVA model in Table 2, Panel A demonstrates that specialist experience significantly
affects reliance on specialist (F = 5.12, p = 0.029) in the predicted direction such that auditors
rely more heavily on advice from matched than mismatched specialists, thus supporting H1a.

19

Professional skepticism was calculated based on participants’ responses to 19 items from the Hurtt (2010) trait
skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance for this study) using a seven-point
Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing the individual's total score by 133.
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TABLE 2
Effects of Specialist Experiencea, Communicationb, and Time Pressurec
on Reliance on Specialistd
Panel A: ANCOVA
Source
Specialist Experience
Communication
Time Pressure
Specialist Experience*Communication
Specialist Experience*Time Pressure
Communication*Time Pressure
Specialist Experience*Communication*Time Pressure
Professional Skepticismf

num
df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

denom
df
43
43
39
43
39
39
39
43

Ftest
5.12
4.04
0.13
0.50
0.25
0.09
0.23
4.75

pvaluee
0.029 **
0.051 *
0.721
0.483
0.619
0.767
0.636
0.035 **

num
df
1
1
1
1
1
1

denom
df
82
82
82
82
82
82

Ftest
1.24
4.24
0.80
4.06
4.08
1.46

pvaluee
0.269
0.043 **
0.375
0.047 **
0.047 **
0.231

num
df
1

denom
df
82

Ftest
5.61

pvaluee
0.020 **

Panel B: Pairwise Contrasts
Source
Effect of Specialist Experience under No Chat
Effect of Specialist Experience under Chat
Effect of Communication under Mismatched
Effect of Communication under Matched
Effect of Specialist Experience under Low Pressure
Effect of Specialist Experience under High Pressure
Panel C: Planned Contrastg
Source
Specialist Experience*Time Pressure
a

Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the
partnered compensation rounds.
b
Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation
rounds.
c
Time pressure was manipulated as a within-subjects variable. When high (low) time
pressure was present, auditors had 5 (20) seconds to submit each estimate.
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TABLE 2 (continued)
d

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess
and the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
e
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
f
Professional Skepticism is a covariate obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.
Each auditors' professional skepticism score was calculated based on 19 items from the Hurtt
(2010) trait skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance)
using a seven-point Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing
the individual's score by 133.
g
Weights: -3 for Mismatched, Low Pressure; -1 for Mismatched, High Pressure; +2 for
Matched, Low Pressure; +2 for Matched, High Pressure
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Serial Mediation Analysis
To more fully evaluate the underlying process of auditors’ reliance on specialist advice,
H1b examines the indirect effects of specialist experience on auditors’ reliance on specialist as
mediated through auditors’ perceived specialist expertise and subsequent trust in specialist.
Measures for both mediators were obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.20 Figure 4
depicts the statistical diagram and Table 3 provides detailed results of the serial mediation
analysis, for which I utilized Preacher and Hayes (2004)’s bootstrapping method. The mediation
results demonstrate that specialist experience significantly affects auditors’ perceived specialist
expertise (t = 3.33, p = 0.002), auditors’ perceived specialist expertise significantly affects
auditors’ trust in specialist (t = 3.66, p = 0.001), and auditors’ trust in specialist significantly
affects auditors’ reliance on specialist (t = 4.03, p < 0.001), thus supporting H1b.

20

Perceived specialist expertise was determined by the post-experimental question, “My partner has relevant
expertise to complete the estimation task”, which was rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Trust in specialist was
determined by the reverse score of the post-experimental question, “I did not trust my partner”, which was also rated
on a seven-point Likert scale.
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FIGURE 4
Statistical Diagram of Serial Mediation Analysis for H1

Perceived
Specialist
Expertise

Relevance of
Specialist
Prior
Experience

t = 3.66, p = 0.001

t = 0.45, p = 0.652
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TABLE 3
Serial Mediation: Effect of Specialist Experiencea on Reliance on Specialistb
through Perceived Specialist Expertisec and Trust in Specialistd (H1)
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise
Coefficient
1.42

Specialist Experience

SE
0.43

t-stat
3.33

p-value
0.002 ***

SE
0.59
0.18

t-stat
-0.93
3.66

p-value
0.357
0.001 ***

SE
0.06
0.02
0.02

t-stat
0.45
2.83
4.03

p-value
0.652
0.007
***
<.001 ***

Panel B: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist
Specialist Experience
Perceived Specialist Expertise

Coefficient
-0.55
0.67

Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist
Specialist Experience
Perceived Specialist Expertise
Trust in Specialist

Coefficient
0.03
0.06
0.06

Panel D: Serial Indirect Effects of Specialist Experiencef
Path
Total
Ind1
Ind2
Ind3

Effect
0.12
0.09
0.06
-0.04

SE
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.04

LLCI
0.004
0.037
0.021
-0.122

ULCI
0.254
0.176
0.141
0.024

a

Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the
partnered compensation rounds.
b

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
c

Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.
Auditors assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a
seven-point Likert scale.
d

Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
e

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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TABLE 3 (continued)
f

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000
bootstrap samples for the serial indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes
(2013). Total represents the total indirect effect of Specialist Experience on Reliance on
Specialist through all specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Specialist
Experience to Perceived Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist. Ind2 represents the
indirect path from Specialist Experience to Perceived Specialist Expertise to Trust in Specialist
to Reliance on Specialist. Ind3 represents the indirect path from Specialist Experience to Trust
in Specialist to Reliance on Specialist.
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Tests of H2
H2a and H2b predict the effect of communication, moderated by specialist experience, on
reliance on specialist. Table 1, Panel B describes the means and standard deviations for key
variables for the two-way interaction of specialist experience and communication, and the
respective means for reliance on specialist are plotted in Figure 5. Results suggest a main effect
of specialist experience such that auditors rely more heavily on specialists’ advice in the matched
versus mismatched condition regardless of communication (matched and chat- 68.73%, matched
and no chat- 54.21% versus mismatched and chat- 49.04%, mismatched and no chat- 46.13%)
and a possible main effect of communication. As a formal test, the ANCOVA model in Table 2,
Panel A confirms a significant main effect of communication on auditors’ reliance on specialist
(F = 4.04, p = 0.051).
The interaction in the ANCOVA model between specialist experience and
communication in Table 2, Panel A, however, is not significant (F = 0.50, p = 0.483), prompting
further evaluation. Table 2, Panel B provides the results of pairwise comparisons for the simple
effects of specialist experience and communication, which indicate that the relevance of
specialists’ prior experience (matched versus mismatched) only significantly affects auditors’
reliance on specialists when communication between auditors and specialists is available (F =
4.24, p = 0.043) and that the opportunity to communicate (chat versus no chat) only significantly
affects auditors’ reliance on specialists when specialists have relevant prior experience (F = 4.06,
p = 0.047), which follows the predicted relationship in H2a but not H2b.
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FIGURE 5
Effects of Specialist Experience and Communication on Reliance on Specialist

75%
68.73%

Reliance on Specialist

70%
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Mismatch

55%
49.04%

50%
46.13%
45%
40%

No Chat

Chat
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Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analyses
H2c, H2d, and H2e examine the indirect effect of communication, moderated by
specialist experience, on auditors’ reliance on specialist as mediated through auditors’ trust in
specialist. Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the statistical diagrams for the mediation and moderated
mediation analyses, respectively. Table 4 and Table 5 provide detailed results of the mediation
and moderated mediation analyses, respectively, for which I utilized Preacher and Hayes
(2004)’s bootstrapping method. The mediation analysis results demonstrate that communication
significantly affects auditors’ trust in specialist (t = 3.53, p = 0.001), and auditors’ trust in
specialist significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialist (t = 5.67, p < 0.001), thus
supporting H2c. However, per the moderated mediation analysis, specialist experience and the
interaction of communication and specialist experience do not have a significant effect on trust
in specialist (t = 0.22, p = 0.829 and t = 0.15, p = 0.883, respectively) or reliance on specialist (t
= 0.75, p = 0.458 and t = 0.82, p = 0.419, respectively) in the model, thus failing to support H2d
and H2e.
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FIGURE 6
Statistical Diagram of Mediation Analysis for H2
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42

Reliance on
Specialist
Advice

TABLE 4
Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Reliance on Specialistb
through Trust in Specialistc (H2)
Panel A: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist
Coefficient SE
1.88
0.53

t-stat p-valued
3.53
0.001 **

Panel B: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist
Coefficient SE
Communication
-0.08
0.07
Trust in Specialist
0.10
0.02

t-stat p-value
-1.15 0.256
5.67
<.001 ***

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Communicatione
Mediator
Trust in Specialist

LLCI ULCI
0.082 0.329

Communication

Effect
0.18

SE
0.06

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
c

Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
d

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.

e

Panel C reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through Trust in
Specialist based on the technique described in Hayes (2013).
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FIGURE 7
Statistical Diagram of Moderated Mediation Analysis for H2
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TABLE 5
Moderated Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Reliance on Specialistb
through Trust in Specialistc, moderated by Specialist Experienced (H2)
Panel A: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist
Coefficient SE
1.77
0.80
0.17
0.77
0.16
1.09

Communication
Specialist Experience
Communication*Specialist Experience

t-stat p-valuee
2.20
0.033 **
0.22
0.829
0.15
0.883

Panel B: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
-0.14
Specialist Experience
0.06
Trust in Specialist
0.10
Communication*Specialist Experience
0.10

SE
0.10
0.09
0.02
0.12

t-stat p-value
-1.47 0.149
0.75
0.458
5.65
<.001 ***
0.82
0.419

Panel C: Conditional Direct Effectsf
Specialist Experience
Matched
Mismatched

Effect
-0.04
-0.14

SE
0.09
0.10

t-stat p-value
-0.45 0.657
-1.47 0.149

Panel D: Conditional Indirect Effectsg
Specialist Experience
Matched
Mismatched

Effect
0.19
0.17

SE LLCI ULCI
0.07 0.057 0.323
0.10 -0.005 0.385

Panel E: Indirect Effect of Highest Order Producth
Mediator
Effect
Trust in Specialist
0.02

SE LLCI ULCI
0.11 -0.204 0.229

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
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c

Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
d

Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the
partnered compensation rounds.
e

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.

f

Panel C presents the direct effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist conditioned on
Specialist Experience.
g

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effects of Communication through Trust in Specialist on Reliance on
Specialist conditioned on Specialist Experience.
h

Panel E reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effect of the highest order product. The moderator, Specialist
Experience, is dichotomous; thus, this is a test of equality of the conditional indirect effects in
the two groups (Hayes 2013).
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Supplemental Mediation Analyses
To determine whether communication affects trust in specialist due to the relevance of
specialists’ expertise and/or a social bond, I conduct two parallel mediation analyses (one for
each specialist experience condition) that evaluate the indirect effect of communication on trust
in specialist through both perceived specialist expertise and bond with specialist considered
simultaneously as mediators. The measure for bond with specialist was obtained from the postexperimental questionnaire.21
Figure 8, Panel A depicts the statistical diagram and Table 6 provides detailed results of
the parallel mediation analysis for the matched condition. Results show that, when specialists
have matched experience, communication significantly affects auditors’ perceived specialist
expertise (t = 2.38, p = 0.025) and bond with specialist (t = 4.53, p < .001), but only perceived
specialist expertise significantly affects trust in specialist (t = 3.01, p = 0.007).
Figure 8, Panel B depicts the statistical diagram and Table 7 provides detailed results of
the parallel mediation analysis for the mismatched condition. Results show that, when specialists
are mismatched, communication only has a significant effect on bond with specialist (t = 6.84, p
< .001), not perceived specialist expertise (t = 1.59, p = 0.128). Furthermore, trust in specialist is
not significantly affected by communication (t = 1.56, p = 0.135), perceived specialist expertise
(t = 0.83, p = 0.418), or bond with specialist (t = -0.83, p = 0.417).

21

Bond with specialist was determined by the post-experimental question, “I developed a bond with my partner”,
which was rated on a seven-point Likert scale.
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FIGURE 8
Parallel Mediation Analysis for Effects on Auditor Trust in Specialist
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TABLE 6
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Trust in Specialistb
through Perceived Specialist Expertisec and Bond with Specialistd
(Matched Condition)e
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise
Communication

Coefficient
1.44

SE
0.60

t-stat
2.38

p-valuef
0.025

**

***

Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
2.77

SE
0.61

t-stat
4.53

p-value
<.001

Panel C: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
1.01
Perceived Specialist Expertise
0.59
Bond with Specialist
0.03

SE
0.73
0.20
0.19

t-stat
1.38
3.01
0.14

p-value
0.183
0.007
0.891

Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communicationg
Path
Effect
Total
0.92
Ind1
0.85
Ind2
0.07

SE
0.64
0.41
0.65

LLCI
-0.218
0.194
-1.350

***

ULCI
2.312
1.897
1.226

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
c

Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point
Likert scale.
d

Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
e

Auditors assigned to the matched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was
trained by estimating the number of gumballs prior to the partnered compensation rounds.
f

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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g

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Trust in Specialist through all specific
indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived Specialist
Expertise to Trust in Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from Communication to
Bond with Specialist to Trust in Specialist.
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TABLE 7
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Trust in Specialistb
through Perceived Specialist Expertisec and Bond with Specialistd
(Mismatched Condition)e
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise
Coefficient
0.78

SE
0.49

t-stat
1.59

p-valuef
0.128

Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
3.75

SE
0.55

t-stat
6.84

p-value
<.001

Communication

Panel C: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
2.72
Perceived Specialist Expertise
0.37
Bond with Specialist
-0.33
Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communicationg
Path
Effect
Total
-0.95
Ind1
0.29
Ind2
-1.23

SE
1.74
0.44
0.40

SE
1.47
0.48
1.51

t-stat
1.56
0.83
-0.83

LLCI
-3.843
-0.296
-4.228

***

p-value
0.135
0.418
0.417

ULCI
1.955
1.860
1.694

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
c

Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point
Likert scale.
d

Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
e

Auditors assigned to the mismatched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was
trained by estimating the weight of corn prior to the partnered compensation rounds.
f

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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g

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Trust in Specialist through all specific
indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived Specialist
Expertise to Trust in Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from Communication to
Bond with Specialist to Trust in Specialist.
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As an additional test, I conduct the same parallel mediation analyses with reliance on
specialist as the dependent variable. Figure 9, Panel A depicts the statistical diagram and Table 8
provides detailed results of the parallel mediation analysis for the matched condition. Results
show that, when specialists have matched experience, communication significantly affects
auditors’ perceived specialist expertise (t = 2.38, p = 0.025) and bond with specialist (t = 4.53, p
< .001), but only perceived specialist expertise significantly affects reliance on specialist (t =
4.03, p = 0.001). Figure 9, Panel B depicts the statistical diagram and Table 9 provides detailed
results of the parallel mediation analysis for the mismatched condition. Results show that, when
specialists are mismatched, communication only has a significant effect on bond with specialist (t
= 6.84, p < .001), not perceived specialist expertise (t = 1.59, p = 0.128). However, only
perceived specialist expertise has a significant effect on reliance on specialist (t = 2.16, p =
0.045). These findings suggest that auditors generally base their reliance decisions on the
relevance of specialists’ experience rather than any social bond that develops through
communication.

53

FIGURE 9
Parallel Mediation Analysis for Effects on Auditor Reliance on Specialist
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TABLE 8
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Reliance on Specialistb
through Perceived Specialist Expertisec and Bond with Specialistd
(Matched Condition)e
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise
Communication

Coefficient
1.44

SE
0.60

t-stat
2.38

p-valuef
0.025

**

***

Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
2.77

SE
0.61

t-stat
4.53

p-value
<.001

Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
-0.02
Perceived Specialist Expertise
0.11
Bond with Specialist
0.00

SE
0.10
0.03
0.03

t-stat
-0.19
4.03
0.16

p-value
0.849
0.001
0.875

Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communicationg
Path
Effect
Total
0.16
Ind1
0.15
Ind2
0.01

SE
0.10
0.08
0.10

LLCI
-0.023
0.027
-0.170

***

ULCI
0.387
0.338
0.216

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
c

Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point
Likert scale.
d

Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
e

Auditors assigned to the matched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was
trained by estimating the number of gumballs prior to the partnered compensation rounds.
f

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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g

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through all
specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived
Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from
Communication to Bond with Specialist to Reliance on Specialist.
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TABLE 9
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communicationa on Reliance on Specialistb
through Perceived Specialist Expertisec and Bond with Specialistd
(Mismatched Condition)e
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise
Coefficient
0.78

SE
0.49

t-stat
1.59

p-valuef
0.128

Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
3.75

SE
0.55

t-stat
6.84

p-value
<.001

Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist
Coefficient
Communication
0.05
Perceived Specialist Expertise
0.13
Bond with Specialist
-0.03

SE
0.23
0.06
0.05

t-stat
0.23
2.16
-0.62

p-value
0.824
0.045
0.546

Communication

Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communicationg
Path
Effect
Total
-0.02
Ind1
0.10
Ind2
-0.12

SE
0.15
0.08
0.15

LLCI
-0.298
-0.004
-0.398

***

**

ULCI
0.280
0.338
0.180

a

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds.
b

Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts.
c

Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point
Likert scale.
d

Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale.
e

Auditors assigned to the mismatched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was
trained by estimating the weight of corn prior to the partnered compensation rounds.
f

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.

57

g

Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through all
specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived
Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from
Communication to Bond with Specialist to Reliance on Specialist.
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Tests of H3
H3 predicts that time pressure will have a more positive effect on auditors’ reliance on
specialists when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience compared to more
relevant, or matched, experience due to a potential ceiling effect in the matched condition. Table
1, Panel C describes the means and standard deviations for key variables for the two-way
interaction of specialist experience and time pressure, and the respective means for reliance on
specialist are plotted in Figure 10. Results suggest a main effect of specialist experience such
that auditors rely more heavily on specialists’ advice in the matched versus mismatched
condition regardless of time pressure. When specialists have matched experience, auditor
reliance is 62.18% and 61.53% in low and high time pressure conditions, respectively. On the
other hand, when specialists have mismatched experience, auditor reliance drops to 45.49% and
49.97% in low and high time pressure conditions, respectively. This pattern of means is
consistent with the predicted trend.
To formally test H3, I performed a planned contrast of cell means22 shown in Table 2,
Panel C. Due to the expected shape, I assigned a contrast weight of -3 for Mismatched, Low
Pressure; -1 for Mismatched, High Pressure; +2 for Matched, Low Pressure; and +2 for Matched,
High Pressure. Results in Table 2, Panel C demonstrate a significant interaction between
specialist experience and time pressure regarding auditors’ reliance on specialists (F = 5.61, p =
0.020), thus supporting H3. This is consistent with the pairwise comparisons for specialist
experience under low and high time pressure in Table 2, Panel B, which indicate that the
relevance of specialists’ prior experience (matched versus mismatched) only significantly affects
auditors’ reliance on specialists when there is low time pressure (F = 4.08, p = 0.047), not when

22

I predict an ordinal interaction between specialist experience and time pressure, making the ANCOVA model an
inappropriate method of analysis (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990).
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there is high time pressure (F = 1.46, p = 0.231). Because auditors often face time constraints,
this finding has important practical implications for audit quality.
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FIGURE 10
Effects of Specialist Experience and Time Pressure on Reliance on Specialist
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Additional Analysis
I also evaluate the effect of specialist experience and communication on auditors’
estimation accuracy by using estimation error as the dependent variable, which is measured as
the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate and the correct amount.23
Estimation error is averaged over all available rounds for each participant, resulting in one
observation per participant.24 The means of estimation error for the two-way interaction of
specialist experience and communication are shown in Table 1, Panel B as well as Figure 11, and
Table 10 includes the ANOVA model with estimation error as the dependent variable and
specialist experience and communication as the independent variables. Results in Table 10
demonstrate a significant main effect of specialist experience (F = 96.44, p < 0.001), indicating
that auditors are more accurate in the matched versus mismatched condition, as well as a
significant interaction effect between specialist experience and communication (F = 3.92, p =
0.054). Per Figure 11, auditors in the matched condition are more accurate when able to
communicate versus not, which is not surprising. Interestingly, though, auditors in the
mismatched condition are less accurate when able to communicate versus not, which has
important practical implications.

23
24

Estimation error = (auditor's final estimate - correct amount) / correct amount.
Results for the ANOVA model in Table10 are statistically unaffected by including time pressure.
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FIGURE 11
Effects of Specialist Experience and Communication on Final Estimation Error

10%

No Chat

Chat

Final Estimation Error

0%
-3.80%

-10%
-20%

-21.91%

Match

Mismatch

-30%
-40%
-50%

-60%

-69.78%

-70%

-75.85%

-80%
-90%

63

TABLE 10
Effects of Specialist Experiencea and Communicationb
on Final Estimation Errorc

d

Source
Specialist Experience
Communication
Specialist Experience*Communication

num
df
1
1
1

denom
df
44
44
44

F-test
96.44
0.97
3.92

p-valuee
<.001
0.330
0.054

a

Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to
the partnered compensation rounds.
b

Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with
their partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the
compensation rounds.
c

Final estimation error = the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate
and the correct amount.
d

Time pressure was collapsed for additional analysis. Including time pressure in the model
does not significantly alter any results.
e

*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to investigate if and how auditors’ reliance on specialists’
valuation of complex estimates is affected by specialists’ expertise, auditor-specialist
communication, and time pressure. I explore this question with a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental
design by manipulating the relevance of specialists’ prior experience for the current valuation
task (matched versus mismatched), the opportunity for pairs to communicate (chat versus no
chat), and the level of time pressure (high versus low). In the experiment, students assigned to
the role of auditor estimate the number of gumballs in a container for 20 rounds. Each round,
before making their final estimate, they receive advice from their partner, a student assigned to
the role of specialist who received prior estimation training.
In my first set of hypotheses, I evaluate the relationship between the relevance of
specialists’ prior experience and auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work. I predict and find that
auditors rely more heavily on advice from specialists with more relevant prior experience
compared to those with less relevant prior experience. By conducting a serial mediation analysis,
I determine that the relevance of specialists’ prior experience affects auditors’ perception of
specialists’ expertise, which influences auditors’ trust in specialists, ultimately affecting auditors’
reliance in specialists’ advice.
In my second set of hypotheses, I investigate auditor-specialist communication. I expect
the opportunity for auditors and specialists to communicate, moderated by the relevance of
specialists’ experience, to influence auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. I find that both the
opportunity to communicate and the relevance of specialists’ experience have significant main
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effects on auditors’ reliance on specialists, although I fail to find a significant interaction
between the two. However, a moderated mediation analysis indicates that the opportunity to
communicate increases auditors’ trust in specialists, which increases their reliance on specialists’
advice. Upon further examination, I find that, in the matched condition, communication causes
auditors to perceive specialists as more expert as well as increase their bond with the specialist,
but it is the perceived expertise that ultimately increases auditors' reliance on specialists, not the
bond. In the mismatched condition, communication only influences auditors’ bond with
specialists, not the perceived specialist expertise, and it is perceived expertise that solely
influences auditors' reliance on specialists.
My final hypothesis addresses time pressure. By performing a planned contrast of cell
means, I demonstrate a significant interaction between the relevance of specialists’ prior
experience and time pressure. Results are consistent with the predicted trend that auditors’
reliance on specialists increases as time pressure increases under the mismatched condition, but a
ceiling effect is in place under the matched condition, causing reliance to remain significantly
unaltered by an increase in time pressure. After examining the simple effects using pairwise
comparisons, I find a significant difference in auditor reliance based on the relevance of
specialists’ prior experience in cases of low time pressure, but there is no significant difference
in auditor reliance based on the relevance of specialists’ prior experience when high time
pressure is present. This finding has important practical implications for audit quality because
auditors often face strict time deadlines, particularly during busy season.
As an additional analysis, I examine the interaction between the relevance of specialists’
prior experience and auditor-specialist communication on auditors’ actual estimation accuracy.
Results show that, although allowing auditor-specialist pairs to communicate improves
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estimation accuracy in the matched condition, the opportunity to communicate actually harms
estimation accuracy in the mismatched condition. This finding indicates that the push to increase
auditor-specialist communication may have unintended consequences on audit quality.
This paper makes several contributions to prior literature. First, auditors’ use of
specialists, particularly regarding fair value measurements, is an important topic that has
generally been addressed qualitatively thus far. My study takes the next step forward by focusing
on several issues identified from the qualitative studies and examining them quantitatively. By
investigating auditors’ reliance on advice received specifically from specialists, I extend both the
auditor advice-taking and expertise research streams. I also build on prior auditor communication
literature by investigating the effects of auditor-specialist interactions and by examining the
underlying factors of trust, perception of expertise, and social bonding. Furthermore, my study
has several methodological advantages that contribute to prior research. Because I employ an
experimental economics setting, I am able to manipulate specialists’ prior experience, which
would otherwise have to be measured, and the interactive setting I use enables me to smoothly
implement my communication variable.
This study also has important implications for practitioners and standard-setters. In
response to problems regarding the auditor-specialist dynamic, the PCAOB is currently working
to amend the auditing guidance regarding auditors’ use of specialists. Due to my experimental
approach, I am able to assess the impact of such amendments ex ante. In doing so, I find that the
PCAOB’s recommendation for increased communication between auditors and specialists may
not always have a desirable outcome. When specialists have mismatched experience, auditor
accuracy is actually better when auditors and specialists do not communicate. My results also
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indicate that, when a specialist is mismatched, increased time pressure leads to increased auditor
reliance, which could be harmful to audit quality.
Because specialists’ work factors into the audit report, which is then referenced by
investors, regulators, creditors, and other users of the financial statements, it is essential to
evaluate how auditors utilize specialists’ work when making audit judgments and decisions.
Regulators and practitioners have noted that auditors appear to over- and under-rely on
specialists’ work, both of which result in lower audit quality. Regulators, practitioners, and
academics all identified serious concerns regarding each of the factors considered in this study,
making this a timely and important topic to explore.
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APPENDIX A: Instructions to be Read Aloud
Thank you for participating in today’s study. This study requires you to work on the
computer at your desk, so please refrain from talking throughout the session. All information in
the study will remain confidential, and you have the right to withdraw from the study at any
time. Today’s session is expected to last approximately one hour. For your participation, you will
be paid $5 at the end of the session today. In addition, you also have the opportunity to earn up to
$100 in prize money based on the decisions you make. You will receive your total payment at
the end of the session today.
The study consists of two stages. At the beginning of Stage 1, the computer will
randomly assign you to one of two roles, either the Guesser or the Estimator. If you are the
Estimator, you will receive 20 rounds of specialized training. In each training round, you will (1)
view a picture of a container filled with some material, (2) make an estimate of the amount of the
material, and (3) then learn the correct amount. Providing feedback after each round is meant to
help you refine your estimation process. If you are the Guesser, you will not participate in the
training rounds, so I have provided various games and puzzles in your envelope that you are
welcome to use while you wait for the Estimators to finish training. These activities are
completely optional, so you do not have to use them, but please remember that talking and cell
phones are not allowed during the session. It is also important to mention that the first stage will
not affect your winnings, but it does provide training for the second stage, which will determine
how much prize money you earn.
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Once Stage 1 is complete, Stage 2 will begin, which also has 20 rounds. At the beginning
of Stage 2, each Guesser will be partnered with one Estimator. Your task is to work together for
all 20 rounds, during which time you will make a series of estimates. In each round, you will be
shown a picture of a container filled with a material. Then the Guesser and Estimator will each
submit an initial estimate of the amount of material. [CHAT CONDITION ONLY: You will then
have the opportunity to chat with your partner on the computer for 30 seconds. Once the chat
period ends, the Guesser will then be provided with the Estimator’s initial estimate.] [NO CHAT
CONDITION ONLY: The Guesser will then be provided with the Estimator’s initial estimate.]
Finally, the Guesser will submit a final estimate, which ends the round. The Guesser-Estimator
pair with the most accurate final estimate wins the round and earns a prize of $10 to be shared
equally, so each partner wins $5. In the case of a tie between multiple pairs, the round’s winning
pair will be randomly determined by the computer. You will learn whether you and your partner
won a round after all rounds have been completed.
It is also important to note that each round during Stage 2 has a time limit for both the
initial and final estimates. The time limit is very important. If you fail to click OK before time
runs out, the computer will automatically move on, and you will lose the opportunity to win the
round. To ensure you keep track of time, the time remaining will be displayed in the top right
corner of your computer screen.
The study concludes once Stage 2 is complete. You will then fill out a brief
questionnaire, after which I will pay you the $5 participation fee plus any prize money you
earned. You will need to sign a receipt form before leaving.
We are now ready to begin the session. Please remember that talking and cell phones are
not allowed at any time.
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APPENDIX B: z-Tree Screenshots
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[MATCHED Condition]
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[MISMATCHED Condition]
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[MATCHED Condition]

Note: MISMATCHED Condition is same photo, but with kernels of corn instead of gumballs.
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Note: MISMATCHED Condition is same photo, but with kernels of corn instead of gumballs.
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[CHAT Condition]
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APPENDIX C: Post-experimental Questionnaire
Please write your Participant ID Number: ____________
Based on today’s study, please indicate whether the following statements are true or false:
1. Each Estimator participated in 20 training rounds before starting Stage 2.
a. True
b. False
2. The training task in Stage 1 was the same as the task in Stage 2 (estimating the
number of gumballs).
a. True
b. False
3. Stage 2 paired each Guesser with the same Estimator for all 20 rounds to work as a
team.
a. True
b. False
4. Stage 2 limited the time allowed to enter an estimate for some, but not all 20 rounds.
a. True
b. False
5. During Stage 2, the Estimator submitted the final amount to determine which pair
won the round.
a. True
b. False
6. It was still possible to win the round if the time limit ran out before entering an
estimate.
a. True
b. False
7. Each round in Stage 2, the winning Guesser-Estimator pair split an additional $10
prize.
a. True
b. False
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Please circle on the scale how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
about today’s study:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

The training rounds provided
relevant experience for the task
in Stage 2.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

We were able to make more
accurate estimates in Stage 2
because of the training rounds.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I did not trust my partner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I was confident in my partner’s
estimation accuracy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I was confident in my own
estimation accuracy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I felt that I was more qualified
than my partner to complete the
estimation task.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I was more confident in the
accuracy of my partner after
communicating with them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I developed a bond with my
partner.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My partner has relevant
expertise to complete the
estimation task.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have relevant expertise to
complete the estimation task.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The time limit made me feel
rushed.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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General Questions (for multiple choice, only circle one answer):
1. What is your age? __________
2. What is your gender?
a. Female
b. Male
3. How would you classify yourself?
a. American Indian/Alaska Native
b. Asian
c. Black/African American
d. Hispanic/Latino
e. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
f. White/Caucasian
g. Multiracial
h. Would rather not say
i. Other; Please specify__________

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. High school or equivalent
b. Vocational/technical school (2 year)
c. Some college
d. Bachelor's degree
e. Master's degree
f. Doctoral degree
g. Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.)
h. Other; Please specify__________
5. What is your current student status?
a. Undergraduate
b. Graduate
c. Other; Please specify__________
6. What is your current/intended major?
a. Accounting
b. Finance
c. Marketing
d. Management
e. Information Systems
f. Undecided
g. Other; Please specify__________
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7. What is your expected graduation year?
a. 2017
b. 2018
c. 2019
d. 2020
e. 2021
f. 2022 or later
Please circle the response that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I often accept other people’s
explanations without further
thought.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel good about myself.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I tend to immediately accept
what other people tell me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am self-assured.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My friends tell me that I
usually question things that I
see or hear.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I usually accept things I see,
read, or hear at face value.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I do not feel sure of myself.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I usually notice
inconsistencies in
explanations.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I wait to decide on issues
until I can get more
information.
I am confident of my
abilities.
I often reject statements
unless I have proof that they
are true.
I take my time when making
decisions.
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Most often I agree with what
the others in my group think.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I dislike having to make
decisions quickly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have confidence in myself.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I do not like to decide until
I’ve looked at all of the
readily available information.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I frequently question things
that I see or hear.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is easy for other people to
convince me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I like to ensure that I’ve
considered most available
information before making a
decision.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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